Beyond KYC Theater: Why Self-Sovereign Identity Is Infrastructure, Not Ideology

Morris Mwanga *Founder, PersonaBlocks*

March 2026

Abstract

On May 6, 2026, Utah becomes the first U.S. state to activate a sovereign digital identity program backed by a legislated bill of rights — including the right to selective disclosure, freedom from government surveillance, and a legal duty of loyalty imposed on every party that touches your identity data. The bill passed both chambers unanimously.

This is not an experiment. It is the beginning of a structural shift.

Every year, billions of dollars are spent on Know Your Customer (KYC) processes that simultaneously fail to prevent fraud and succeed in creating massive honeypots of personal data. Meanwhile, over a billion people worldwide remain excluded from financial services because they lack the government-issued credentials these systems demand. Self-sovereign identity (SSI) — where individuals hold, control, and selectively disclose their own verified credentials — offers a structural fix to both problems. This paper argues that sovereign identity is not a philosophical luxury but a practical infrastructure requirement for the next decade of digital services. Drawing on first-hand experience building PersonaBlocks, a sovereign KYC platform on Polygon, and the legislative breakthrough of Utah's S.B. 275, I examine the technical architecture, the economic incentives, the regulatory landscape, and the honest obstacles that remain.

1. The Identity Tax

In 2017, Equifax disclosed that attackers had accessed the personal data of 147 million Americans — names, Social Security numbers, birth dates, addresses, and in some cases driver's license numbers. The company had stored this data in plaintext. They paid a $700 million settlement. Consumers received approximately $4 each.

This was not an anomaly. It was a consequence of architecture.

The modern identity system operates on a model that would strike any engineer as absurd if they encountered it for the first time: every service provider independently collects, verifies, and stores a complete copy of your most sensitive personal information. Open a bank account — upload your passport, proof of address, a selfie. Apply for a mortgage — do it again. Sign up for a cryptocurrency exchange — again. Each copy sits in a separate database, maintained by a separate team, with a separate security posture, governed by a separate compliance regime.

The result is predictable. T-Mobile: 77 million records. 23andMe: 6.9 million genetic profiles. MOVEit: 62 million across 2,500 organizations. Each breach is treated as a discrete event, a failure of one company's security practices. But the real failure is structural. The architecture *requires* that sensitive data be duplicated across hundreds of databases. Every copy is an attack surface. The question is never whether a breach will happen, but which database will be next.

For businesses, this duplication carries a direct cost. Global spending on KYC compliance exceeded $35 billion in 2025. The average onboarding cost per customer at a major bank ranges from $30 to $300, depending on jurisdiction and risk tier. Much of this cost is pure redundancy — verifying the same passport photo that three other institutions verified last month.

For users, the cost is measured in time, friction, and risk. The average consumer completes KYC processes six to ten times across financial services alone. Each instance requires uploading identity documents to a system they do not control, operated by an entity whose security practices they cannot audit, under terms of service they did not read.

And then there are those who cannot participate at all. The World Bank estimates that 850 million people globally lack any form of official identification. Without a government-issued ID, they cannot open a bank account, receive a mobile money transfer, prove land ownership, or access social services. The identity system does not merely fail to protect these people — it renders them invisible.

The pattern is clear: centralized identity is expensive for businesses, dangerous for users, and exclusionary for the most vulnerable. It persists not because it works, but because alternatives were not technically viable until recently.

That is changing.

2. What Sovereign Actually Means

The term "self-sovereign identity" carries ideological baggage that obscures its practical meaning. It is not a manifesto for anonymity. It is not a rejection of government authority. It is a specific architectural pattern with concrete technical properties.

In the SSI model, three roles exist:

- **Issuers** create and sign credentials. A government issues a passport credential. A university issues a degree credential. A KYC provider issues a verification credential.
- **Holders** store credentials in a digital wallet they control. They choose when, to whom, and how much to disclose.
- **Verifiers** request and validate credentials. A bank verifies that a customer holds a valid KYC credential. An employer verifies a degree.

The critical difference from the current system is where data lives and who controls disclosure. Today, the verifier collects and stores the raw data. In SSI, the verifier receives a cryptographic proof that the credential exists, is valid, and was issued by a trusted authority — without necessarily receiving the underlying data.

Consider a concrete example. A bar needs to verify that a customer is over 21. Today, the customer hands over a driver's license. The bartender sees their full name, date of birth, home address, license number, height, weight, and organ donor status — far more information than the question requires. In an SSI system, the customer presents a zero-knowledge proof that their age credential, issued by their state DMV, confirms they are over 21. The bartender learns one bit of information: yes or no.

This is not hypothetical cryptography. Zero-knowledge proofs for age verification, credential ownership, and range proofs are production-ready in 2026. The EU's eIDAS 2.0 regulation, which mandates digital identity wallets for all EU citizens by 2027, explicitly supports selective disclosure. The technical infrastructure exists. The question is adoption.

Christopher Allen's ten principles of self-sovereign identity, published in 2016, remain the clearest articulation of the model:

1. **Existence.** Users must have an independent existence outside of digital systems.
2. **Control.** Users must control their identities and be the ultimate authority on their identity data.
3. **Access.** Users must have access to their own data, with no hidden data.
4. **Transparency.** Systems and algorithms must be transparent and open-source.
5. **Persistence.** Identities must be long-lived, ideally lasting a lifetime.
6. **Portability.** Identity must not be held by a singular third party.
7. **Interoperability.** Identities should be as widely usable as possible.
8. **Consent.** Users must agree to the use of their identity.
9. **Minimization.** Disclosure of claims must be minimized — only the minimum necessary data should be shared.
10. **Protection.** The rights of users must be protected, even against the operators of the identity system itself.

These are not aspirational goals. They are engineering requirements. A system that satisfies them produces specific, measurable outcomes: reduced data duplication, user-controlled disclosure, cryptographic verifiability, and no single point of compromise.

It is worth distinguishing SSI from two models it is often confused with:

Federated identity (Sign in with Google, Sign in with Apple) reduces the number of passwords a user manages, but concentrates control in the identity provider. Google knows every service you authenticate with. If Google suspends your account, you lose access to everything that depends on it. The user is a tenant, not an owner.

Centralized government identity (national ID databases, Aadhaar) solves the issuance problem but creates exactly the kind of honeypot that SSI avoids. India's Aadhaar database — 1.4 billion biometric records in a single system — represents the largest single point of failure in the history of identity. A breach of Aadhaar would make Equifax look trivial.

SSI is not anti-government or anti-institution. It requires issuers — often governments — to create credentials. What it changes is the *storage and disclosure model*

. The government issues the credential. The user holds it. The verifier checks it. No one accumulates a database of everyone's everything.

Utah's S.B. 275, which takes effect May 6, 2026, encodes this distinction into law with a phrase that may prove historic: identity is *endorsed* by the state, not *bestowed* by it. The state verifies and signs your credential. You hold it. You choose when and to whom you disclose it. The state does not track your usage, profile your behavior, or withhold services if you prefer a physical ID. This is SSI as legislation — not a whitepaper principle, but an enforceable right.

3. The Technical Architecture

Sovereign identity is built on three interlocking standards, each solving a distinct problem.


🏛 ISSUER
Performs Verification
Face match · Liveness ·
Sanctions
Issues Verifiable
Identity Certificate (VIC)
Signs & registers
VIC on-chain
Encrypts docs with
user's public key
🔗 Trust Infrastructure
Polygon Blockchain
Immutable Registry
Access Permissions
IPFS
Encrypted Document
Storage
Verifies permission
exists
VIC ownership
proof
Encrypted docs
(only user can decrypt)
Approves access
(on-chain consent)
🏢 VERIFIER
Requests Access
to Specific docTypes
Receives Cryptographic
Proof of Verification
Revoke?
👤 HOLDER
)
Holds Encrypted
Credentials in VIC
Controls Disclosure
Grants/Revokes Access

Figure 1: The self-sovereign identity model. The issuer (PersonaBlocks) verifies and signs credentials. The holder (user's wallet) controls storage and disclosure. The verifier (merchant) receives cryptographic proof — never raw data. Polygon and IPFS provide the trust and storage infrastructure.

3.1 Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs)

A DID is a globally unique identifier that the subject controls, without requiring a central registration authority. The W3C DID specification, which reached full recommendation status in 2022, defines the format:

```
did:method:specific-identifier
```

For example: `did:polygon:0x1234abcd...` or `did:web:personablocks.io:users:alice`

Each DID resolves to a DID Document — a JSON-LD structure containing the subject's public keys, authentication methods, and service endpoints. The DID Document is the root of trust: anyone who resolves the DID can verify signatures made by the subject without contacting a central authority.

DIDs can be anchored on a blockchain (providing immutability and global resolution), on a web server (providing simplicity), or on a peer-to-peer basis (providing privacy). The method determines the trust and availability properties.

3.2 Verifiable Credentials (VCs)

A Verifiable Credential is a tamper-evident digital credential whose authorship can be cryptographically verified. The W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model, also a full recommendation, defines the structure:

```
{
  "@context": ["https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1"],
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "IdentityVerification"],
  "issuer": "did:polygon:0xPersonaBlocks...",
  "issuanceDate": "2026-03-11T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:polygon:0xUserWallet...",
    "kycVerified": true,
    "verificationLevel": "enhanced",
    "livenessConfirmed": true
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "EcdsaSecp256k1Signature2019",
    "verificationMethod": "did:polygon:0xPersonaBlocks...#key-1",
    "proofValue": "z58DAdFfa9..."
  }
}
```

The credential is signed by the issuer's private key. Any verifier can check the signature against the issuer's DID Document without contacting the issuer. The credential is held by the subject in their wallet. The issuer does not need to be online for verification to succeed.

3.3 Client-Side Encryption and Zero-Knowledge Storage



Figure 2: Encryption key derivation. The user signs a deterministic message → keccak256 produces a 32-byte private key → secp256k1 derives the public key → eccrypto encrypts all documents. Encrypted blobs go to IPFS; only content hashes are stored on-chain.

The most sensitive part of any identity system is biometric data: photographs, face scans, fingerprints. In a sovereign architecture, this data must never exist in plaintext on a server.

At PersonaBlocks, we solve this with wallet-derived encryption. When a user connects their wallet, they sign a deterministic message:

```
PersonaBlocks document decryption
Wallet: 0xUserAddress
```

The signature is passed through keccak256 to derive a 32-byte private key, from which a secp256k1 public key is computed. All biometric data — selfie, government ID, 3D face model, KYC records, compliance reports — is encrypted client-side with this public key using eccrypto (AES-256-CBC with ECIES). The encrypted blobs are uploaded to IPFS. The IPFS content hashes are registered on-chain in a smart contract registry.

The server processes biometric data during the initial verification (face comparison, liveness detection, 3D reconstruction) and then encrypts the results before storage. After encryption, the server does not retain plaintext. Decryption happens exclusively in the user's browser when they connect their wallet and sign the derivation message.

This produces a system where:

- **IPFS nodes** store encrypted blobs they cannot read.
- **The blockchain** stores content hashes, not data.
- **The server** handles verification but does not retain results in plaintext.
- **Only the user's wallet signature** can decrypt the data.

If the server is compromised, the attacker gets encrypted blobs and IPFS hashes — useless without the user's wallet private key. If IPFS is compromised (it is public by design), the data is encrypted. If the blockchain is read (it is public by design), it reveals only that a verification occurred, not what it contained.

This is not theoretical. It is deployed and operational on Polygon Amoy testnet.

3.4 On-Chain Registries

A minimal set of smart contracts provides the coordination layer:

- **VIC Registry**: Maps wallet addresses to Verifiable Identity Certificates. Each VIC contains IPFS hashes for each document type (selfie, government ID, 3D model, KYC record, face comparison, video analysis, liveness analysis, compliance report).
- **Document Registry**: Tracks which documents belong to which VIC, enabling verifiers to request specific document types.
- **Access Control**: Manages which merchants can access which document types for which users, with explicit user consent recorded on-chain.
- **Merchant Registry**: Tracks verified businesses that can request access to user credentials.

The contracts are intentionally thin. They store hashes and permissions, not data. The chain provides ordering, immutability, and transparency — it is an audit trail, not a database.

4. Why Now — The Convergence

Self-sovereign identity has been discussed since at least 2016. What has changed is that five independent trends have converged to make it practical in 2026.

4.1 Wallet Infrastructure Has Matured

In 2020, interacting with a blockchain wallet required installing a browser extension, writing down a 24-word seed phrase, understanding gas fees, and navigating transaction confirmations. The user experience was a filter that excluded everyone except cryptocurrency enthusiasts.

In 2026, wallet connection is a two-click process. Libraries like RainbowKit and WalletConnect abstract the complexity. Smart contract wallets support social recovery, session keys, and gas sponsorship. Passkey-based wallets eliminate seed phrases entirely. The wallet is becoming invisible — a background authentication layer rather than a user-facing product.

This matters because SSI requires users to hold credentials in a wallet. If the wallet is unusable, the entire model fails regardless of its technical merits. The UX gap has closed enough that mainstream deployment is feasible.

4.2 Zero-Knowledge Proofs Are Production-Ready

Selective disclosure — the ability to prove a property of a credential without revealing the credential itself — is the core value proposition of SSI. It requires zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs).

Until recently, ZKPs were expensive to generate, slow to verify, and required specialized cryptographic expertise to implement. The development of efficient proof systems (Groth16, PLONK, Halo2, and more recently folding-based schemes) has reduced proving times from minutes to seconds and verification to milliseconds. ZK rollups on Ethereum process millions of transactions per day using these proofs. The infrastructure is battle-tested.

Practical ZKP tooling now allows credential holders to prove statements like "I am over 18," "I am a resident of the EU," or "I passed KYC with a score above 80" without revealing their date of birth, home address, or full verification record.

4.3 Regulation Is Moving Toward User-Controlled Identity

The EU's eIDAS 2.0 regulation requires all EU member states to offer digital identity wallets to citizens by 2027. These wallets must support selective disclosure and user consent for data sharing. The regulation does not use the term "self-sovereign," but its technical requirements map closely to the SSI architecture.

In the United States, multiple states have launched or piloted mobile driver's licenses (mDLs) following the ISO 18013-5 standard, which supports selective disclosure. The TSA accepts digital IDs at over 30 airports.

But the most significant U.S. development is Utah's S.B. 275, the State-Endorsed Digital Identity Program Amendments, which takes effect on May 6, 2026. Sponsored by Senator Kirk Cullimore and passed unanimously by both the Utah Senate (25-0) and House, the bill establishes what may be the strongest privacy framework for a government digital identity program in the United States.

S.B. 275 creates a **digital identity bill of rights** with four enforceable protections:

1. **Right to physical ID.** The government cannot withhold services from residents who choose not to use digital identity. Adoption is voluntary, not coerced.
2. **Right to refuse.** No one can be compelled to use digital identification.
3. **Right to selective disclosure.** Residents can confirm only the attributes a transaction requires — for example, proving they meet a minimum age without revealing their actual birthdate or address.
4. **Right to freedom from surveillance.** The bill bars routine tracking, profiling, or persistent monitoring through the digital identity system.

The bill goes further by imposing a **duty of loyalty** on every party in the chain — the state, digital wallet providers, and verifying parties. No actor may process identity attributes in ways that exploit users, conflict with their best interests, or cause them disproportionate harm. This is not a guideline. It is an enforceable legal obligation.

Architecturally, Utah's program uses **device-based credentials stored in a mobile wallet** rather than a centralized government database — the same design pattern that underpins SSI. The state endorses the identity and signs the credential. The user holds it on their device. Wallet providers must obtain explicit consent before processing any attribute and implement state-of-the-art security.

The ACLU has called Utah's approach the right way to do government digital identity. The Libertas Institute, a libertarian-leaning policy group, actively supported the bill. When the ACLU and Libertas agree on a technology policy, something fundamental has shifted.

The Office of the Legislative Auditor General will conduct a comprehensive audit beginning January 2028, evaluating compliance with anti-surveillance restrictions and overall program effectiveness. Utah is not just passing a law — it is building an accountability framework.

India's Digital Personal Data Protection Act (2023) established consent-based data processing requirements that align naturally with SSI's disclosure model.

The regulatory direction is clear: toward user consent, data minimization, and portable credentials. Whether regulators adopt the SSI label is irrelevant. They are adopting its principles. And in Utah, they are adopting its architecture.

4.4 Deepfakes Make Liveness Verification Urgent

The proliferation of AI-generated images and videos has made photographic identity documents unreliable in isolation. A high-quality synthetic face can fool basic document verification systems. The response has been increasingly sophisticated liveness detection: 3D face reconstruction, multi-frame video analysis, behavioral biometrics.

But liveness detection data is extraordinarily sensitive. A 3D mesh of someone's face, combined with their government ID, is a near-complete biometric profile. Under the current model, every service provider that performs liveness checks accumulates a database of these profiles. SSI inverts this: liveness verification is performed once, the result is encrypted and stored under the user's control, and subsequent verifiers receive a credential attesting to the result without accessing the raw biometric data.

At PersonaBlocks, we capture a selfie, a face video, and a government ID. The server performs face comparison using ArcFace embeddings, 3D face reconstruction using MediaPipe, and AI-powered liveness analysis. The results are encrypted with the user's wallet-derived key and uploaded to IPFS. A merchant who needs to verify a customer's identity receives a cryptographic attestation that liveness verification was completed — they do not receive the face mesh or the video frames.

4.5 The Cost of the Status Quo Is Accelerating

Global KYC compliance costs are growing at approximately 15% per year, driven by expanding regulatory scope (AML6 in the EU, the Corporate Transparency Act in the US) and increasing fraud sophistication. Banks report that 10-20% of new customer applications are abandoned during KYC due to friction.

At the same time, the cost of data breach remediation continues to rise. IBM's 2025 Cost of a Data Breach report puts the average at $4.88 million per incident, with healthcare and financial services significantly higher.

The economic case for SSI is straightforward: verify once, reuse everywhere, store nowhere centrally. A single KYC credential, issued by a trusted verifier and held by the user, can be presented to any number of relying parties without repeating the verification process or duplicating the underlying data. The issuer's cost is amortized across all verifiers. The user's friction drops to a single interaction. The attack surface contracts from N databases to zero — because no central database exists.

5. Who Benefits

5.1 Users

The most immediate benefit is control. When your identity credentials live in a wallet you control, you decide who sees what. A mortgage lender receives proof of your income bracket without seeing your bank statements. An age-restricted service confirms you are over 21 without learning your birth date. A new employer verifies your right to work without photocopying your passport.

The secondary benefit is security through elimination. You cannot breach a database that does not exist. If every service provider holds only cryptographic proofs rather than raw personal data, the value of compromising any single provider drops to near zero. There is nothing to steal.

The tertiary benefit is portability. A KYC credential verified in one jurisdiction can be recognized in another, subject to mutual recognition agreements between verifiers. Moving countries, switching banks, or changing service providers no longer requires starting the identity verification process from scratch.

5.2 Businesses

For businesses, the economics are compelling. KYC-as-a-service providers already exist, but they still require each relying party to store a copy of the verification result and often the underlying documents. SSI eliminates the storage obligation entirely. The business receives a verifiable credential, checks its signature, and makes an access decision. It does not need to store, protect, encrypt, back up, or eventually delete the underlying personal data.

This reduces: - **Compliance cost**: No PII storage means reduced obligations under GDPR, CCPA, and sector-specific regulations. - **Breach liability**: You cannot leak data you do not hold. - **Onboarding friction**: Accepting a pre-verified credential is faster than running a new verification. - **Infrastructure cost**: No need to build and maintain secure document storage systems.

For merchants in regulated industries — financial services, healthcare, legal — the reduction in compliance overhead is substantial. A merchant on PersonaBlocks can verify a customer's identity by requesting access to their on-chain VIC. The customer approves access from their wallet. The merchant receives encrypted documents, decrypted with a key the customer provides. If the merchant's access is revoked, the decryption key is no longer available. The merchant never builds a local database of customer biometrics.

5.3 Regulators

Regulators benefit from SSI in ways that are counterintuitive. A common objection is that sovereign identity undermines regulatory oversight — that if users control their data, regulators lose visibility. The opposite is true.

On-chain identity registries provide an immutable audit trail of every verification, every access grant, and every access revocation. Regulators can verify that a financial institution performed KYC on a customer by checking the on-chain record, without accessing the customer's personal data. Sanctions screening results, suspicious activity reports, and compliance decisions can be anchored to verifiable timestamps.

PersonaBlocks generates compliance reports (covering sanctions screening, IP intelligence, and contact verification) that are encrypted and stored on-chain. A regulator with appropriate authority can request access through the same consent mechanism as any other verifier. The system does not hide compliance — it makes compliance auditable.

5.4 The Excluded

For the 850 million people without formal government identification, SSI offers a path to inclusion that centralized systems cannot. A sovereign identity does not require a government to issue it first. A community organization, an NGO, an employer, or a peer network can issue credentials that establish identity attributes. These credentials gain trust through the reputation of their issuers and the consistency of their attestations, not through the authority of a single government database.

A refugee who has lost their identity documents but has been verified by UNHCR can hold a credential attesting to their identity, their skills, and their medical history. A farmer in a region without land registries can hold credentials from local authorities attesting to land use. A gig worker can accumulate verified work history credentials from multiple platforms into a single portable profile.

This is not charity. It is infrastructure. The unbanked and undocumented represent an enormous market that the current identity system structurally excludes. SSI lowers the barrier to entry by decoupling identity from any single issuer.

6. What Is Holding It Back

Intellectual honesty requires acknowledging the obstacles. SSI is not a pure improvement over the status quo in every dimension. It introduces new problems while solving old ones.

6.1 Key Management Is Still Hard

If your identity credentials live in a wallet, and the wallet is controlled by a private key, then losing that key means losing your identity. This is a real problem. Hardware wallets get lost. Phones get stolen. Seed phrases get forgotten.

Social recovery (where a set of trusted contacts can collectively restore access), smart contract wallets with multiple authentication factors, and passkey-based systems all mitigate this risk. But none of them are as simple as clicking "Forgot Password" on a centralized service. The UX gap has narrowed significantly, but it has not closed.

This is the single largest barrier to mainstream SSI adoption. The industry must solve key management to the point where a non-technical user can recover their identity credentials after losing their phone, without understanding the underlying cryptography.

6.2 The Interoperability Problem

Multiple SSI frameworks exist: Sovrin, ION, KILT, Polygon ID, SpruceID, among others. Each uses different DID methods, different credential formats, and different proof systems. A credential issued on one network is not automatically verifiable on another.

The W3C standards (DID Core, Verifiable Credentials) provide a common data model, but the implementation details vary enough that true interoperability requires bridge infrastructure that is still being built. The Decentralized Identity Foundation (DIF) and the Trust over IP Foundation (ToIP) are working on this, but progress is slow relative to the pace of deployment.

6.3 The Chicken-and-Egg Problem

SSI is a network. Its value increases with the number of issuers and verifiers participating. But issuers are reluctant to issue credentials that few verifiers accept, and verifiers are reluctant to accept credentials that few users hold.

Breaking this cycle requires anchor use cases — specific, high-value scenarios where SSI provides such a compelling advantage that adoption becomes self-reinforcing. Regulatory mandates (eIDAS 2.0) help by guaranteeing a baseline of issuers and verifiers. Enterprise pilots in banking, healthcare, and supply chain are establishing proof points.

6.4 Regulatory Uncertainty

Some jurisdictions view user-controlled identity as a threat to state authority. Others lack the technical sophistication to evaluate SSI proposals. And the regulatory landscape varies dramatically: what is legal in Estonia may be impossible in China.

The good news is that the direction of travel is toward SSI principles, even when the terminology differs. But regulatory clarity on cross-border credential recognition, liability frameworks, and data protection compliance for on-chain systems is still emerging.

6.5 Blockchain Skepticism

SSI does not strictly require a blockchain. DIDs can be anchored on web servers, and credentials can be verified peer-to-peer. But blockchains provide properties — immutability, censorship resistance, global availability — that strengthen the trust model significantly.

However, blockchain technology carries reputational baggage from cryptocurrency speculation, environmental concerns (largely addressed by proof-of-stake), and association with scams. Enterprise adopters and regulators sometimes reject blockchain-based solutions reflexively, regardless of their technical merit.

The response is not to hide the blockchain but to make it invisible. Users should not need to know or care that their identity credentials are anchored on Polygon. They should know that their credentials are tamper-proof, globally verifiable, and under their control. The implementation detail is irrelevant to the value proposition.

7. A Builder's Perspective


📸 Capture (Client-Side)
Selfie Photo
Face Video (Liveness)
Government ID Photo
⚙️ Server Processing (Parallel)
MediaPipe 3D Reconstruction 478 landmarks → 13.6K triangles (docType 2)
Claude AI Liveness Analysis (docType 6)
ArcFace Face Comparison (docType 4)
Multi-Frame Video Analysis (docType 5)
Compliance Sanctions · IP · Phone · Email (docType 7)
KYC Record Personal Info + Biometrics (docType 3)
docType 0
docType 1
🔐 Encryption & Storage
Client-Side Encryption eccrypto AES-256-CBC
IPFS Upload 8 Encrypted Documents (docTypes 0-7)
On-Chain VIC Polygon Amoy IPFS Hashes Registered

Figure 3: End-to-end KYC pipeline. Capture (selfie, video, government ID) feeds six parallel processing stages. All results are encrypted client-side and uploaded to IPFS. The on-chain VIC stores only IPFS content hashes.


🏢 Merchant
🔗 Polygon Smart Contracts
👤 User (Wallet)
☁️ IPFS
🌐 Browser (Client-Side)
Phase 1: Access Request
requestAccess(vicId, docTypes[])
🔔 Notification: "Merchant X requests access to Selfie, Gov ID"
Phase 2: User Consent (On-Chain)
Review request details
approveAccess(merchantAddr, docTypes[])
📝 Signs transaction with wallet
Record permission on-chain (immutable audit trail)
🔔 Access granted
Phase 3: Encrypted Document Retrieval
Verify permission exists
✅ Permission confirmed
Fetch encrypted documents by CID from VIC registry
🔒 Encrypted blobs (AES-256-CBC + ECIES)
Phase 4: Decryption (Client-Side Only)
Display in merchant portal
Connect wallet + sign decryption message
Derive decryption key keccak256(signature) → secp256k1
Decrypt documents locally
🔒 Plaintext never leaves browser
Phase 5: Revocation
revokeAccess(merchantAddr)
Remove permission on-chain
🔔 Access revoked
Merchant can no longer request decryption
🏢 Merchant
🔗 Polygon Smart Contracts
👤 User (Wallet)
☁️ IPFS
🌐 Browser (Client-Side)

Figure 4: Access control flow. A merchant requests access on-chain → the user approves from their wallet → encrypted documents are retrieved from IPFS → decryption happens exclusively in the browser. Revocation removes on-chain permission instantly.

I built PersonaBlocks to prove that sovereign identity is not a whitepaper abstraction — it is buildable, deployable, and functional with current technology. Here is what I learned.

7.1 The Encryption Model Works

Client-side encryption with wallet-derived keys is the architectural decision I am most confident in. The user signs a deterministic message with their wallet. We derive a secp256k1 keypair from the signature hash. All documents — selfie, government ID, 3D face model, KYC records, compliance reports — are encrypted with the user's public key before touching IPFS.

The server processes biometric data during initial verification but does not retain plaintext results. Decryption happens exclusively in the browser. This means a server compromise yields only encrypted blobs. An IPFS compromise yields only encrypted blobs. The only way to access a user's data is to compromise their wallet private key — and if that is compromised, the attacker has bigger problems than identity theft.

The practical challenge was performance. Encrypting and uploading eight document types to IPFS during a single KYC session takes time. We parallelized the pipeline: face comparison, 3D reconstruction, and liveness analysis run concurrently, and each result is encrypted and uploaded as it completes. The total end-to-end time for a full KYC verification is under 60 seconds.

7.2 On-Chain Gas Costs Are Manageable

A common objection to blockchain-based identity is gas cost. On Polygon Amoy (a testnet, but representative of Polygon mainnet economics), registering a VIC with eight document hashes costs approximately $0.01–0.05 in MATIC. Even at Ethereum L1 prices, the cost would be $2–10 per verification — still cheaper than the $30–300 that traditional KYC costs.

Layer 2 networks and the continued reduction in gas costs make on-chain identity economically viable at scale. The cost trajectory is downward.

7.3 Compliance Is Not Optional

The most important lesson I learned is that "sovereign" does not mean "unregulated." A KYC platform, even one that gives users control over their data, must comply with AML regulations, sanctions screening requirements, and suspicious activity reporting obligations.

PersonaBlocks runs sanctions screening against OFAC, UN, EU, and Canadian sanctions lists — over 30,000 entries with multi-stage name matching (exact, full-text search, fuzzy Jaro-Winkler, date-of-birth boosting). If a screening hit exceeds 0.85 confidence, a Suspicious Activity Report is automatically generated in BSA XML 2.0 format. The compliance results are encrypted and stored as part of the user's VIC, providing an auditable record that screening was performed.

This matters because regulators will not accept SSI systems that circumvent compliance. The value proposition of sovereign identity is not "escape regulation." It is "comply more efficiently while giving users control over their data." Any builder who ignores compliance will find their system unusable in regulated markets.

7.4 Liveness Detection Is the Frontier

The arms race between deepfake generation and liveness detection is the most technically challenging aspect of identity verification in 2026. We use a multi-layer approach:

- **3D face reconstruction** using MediaPipe's 478-landmark face mesh, subdivided to ~13,600 triangles. A flat image or a screen replay fails to produce consistent 3D geometry.
- **Multi-frame video analysis** using ArcFace embeddings to verify that the face in the video matches the face in the selfie and the government ID, across multiple frames and angles.
- **AI-powered scene analysis** to detect presentation attacks: screens, masks, printed photos, and other spoofing vectors.

Each layer produces a separate encrypted credential stored in the user's VIC. A verifier who needs high assurance can request all three; a verifier with lower requirements might accept only the face comparison result. This granularity is a direct benefit of the SSI model — different verifiers can consume different levels of assurance from the same underlying verification.

7.5 The User Experience Must Come First

No one adopts a system because it is architecturally elegant. Users adopt systems that are fast, simple, and solve a problem they have.

The PersonaBlocks flow is: connect wallet, sign a message, take a selfie, take a photo of your ID, record a short video. Behind the scenes, eight document types are processed, encrypted, uploaded to IPFS, and registered on-chain. The user sees a progress bar and a result screen.

They do not see IPFS hashes, smart contract transactions, or encryption parameters.

The customer portal lets users view their verified documents by connecting their wallet and signing the decryption message. The documents appear as images and structured data. The blockchain and IPFS are invisible.

This is how SSI must be deployed to reach mainstream adoption. The cryptography is the foundation, but the user experience is the product.

8. Where This Goes

8.1 The Standards to Watch

- **W3C DID Core** and **Verifiable Credentials Data Model**: The foundational standards. Already at W3C Recommendation status.
- **eIDAS 2.0 Architecture and Reference Framework (ARF)**: Defines the technical requirements for EU digital identity wallets. Will drive the largest SSI deployment in history.
- **ISO 18013-5 (mDL)**: The standard for mobile driver's licenses. Already deployed at US airports.
- **ERC-735 (Claim Holder)** and related Ethereum standards: On-chain credential management for EVM-compatible chains.
- **OpenID for Verifiable Credentials (OID4VC)**: Bridges the existing OpenID Connect ecosystem with Verifiable Credentials, enabling incremental adoption.

8.2 For Developers

If you are building applications that handle user identity — authentication, KYC, age verification, credential checking — start designing for a world where the user holds the credential and you verify a proof. The shift is coming regardless of which specific SSI framework prevails.

Practical first steps: 1. Implement wallet-based authentication alongside traditional email/password. 2. Design your data model so that PII can be replaced with credential references. 3. Adopt the Verifiable Credentials data model for any credentials your application issues. 4. Test with Polygon ID, SpruceID, or similar frameworks that provide end-to-end tooling.

8.3 For Policymakers

The goal of identity regulation should be to protect individuals while enabling verification. SSI achieves both more effectively than centralized databases.

Recommendations: 1. **Study Utah's S.B. 275 as a model.** It demonstrates that sovereign identity legislation can pass unanimously, satisfy both civil liberties advocates (ACLU) and limited-government advocates (Libertas), and include concrete technical mandates (device-based credentials, selective disclosure, anti-surveillance). 2. Mandate data minimization in identity verification — do not require businesses to store what they do not need. 3. Establish mutual recognition frameworks for digital credentials across jurisdictions. 4. Define clear liability rules for credential issuers, holders, and verifiers. 5. Fund open-source SSI infrastructure as public goods — the identity layer should not be owned by any single company.

8.4 For Everyone

The next time you upload a photo of your passport to a website, ask yourself: why does this company need a permanent copy of my identity document? What happens to it after they verify my age, my address, or my right to work? Who else has access to it? What happens when — not if — their database is breached?

You deserve better. The technology exists. The standards are written. The regulatory momentum is building. The question is not whether sovereign identity will become the default. The question is how much data will be breached before it does.

References

1. Allen, C. (2016). "The Path to Self-Sovereign Identity." *Life With Alacrity*.
2. W3C. (2022). "Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0." W3C Recommendation.
3. W3C. (2022). "Verifiable Credentials Data Model v1.1." W3C Recommendation.
4. European Commission. (2024). "eIDAS 2.0: The European Digital Identity Framework."
5. World Bank. (2024). "Identification for Development (ID4D) Global Dataset."

6. IBM Security. (2025). "Cost of a Data Breach Report 2025."
7. Sovrin Foundation. (2018). "Sovrin: A Protocol and Token for Self-Sovereign Identity and Decentralized Trust."
8. Preukschat, A., & Reed, D. (2021). *Self-Sovereign Identity: Decentralized Digital Identity and Verifiable Credentials*. Manning Publications.
9. Mühle, A., Grüner, A., Gayvoronskaya, T., & Meinel, C. (2018). "A Survey on Essential Components of a Self-Sovereign Identity." *Computer Science Review*, 30, 80–86.
10. Brunner, C., Gallersdörfer, U., & Matthes, F. (2024). "Self-Sovereign Identity on the Blockchain: Contextual Analysis and Quantification of SSI Principles Implementation." *Frontiers in Blockchain*, 7.
11. Utah State Legislature. (2026). "S.B. 275: State-Endorsed Digital Identity Program Amendments." Passed Senate 25-0 (Feb 24), House unanimously (Mar 4). Effective May 6, 2026. https://le.utah.gov/~2026/bills/static/SB0275.html
12. ACLU. (2026). "There's Only One State That Is Asking the Right Questions About Digital Identity." https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/digital-id-utah
13. Libertas Institute. (2026). "SB 275: Modernizing Utah's Identity Rights in the Digital Age." https://libertas.institute/bill/sb-275-modernizing-utahs-identity-rights-in-the-digital-age/
14. Blockchain Commons. (2026). "Musings of a Trust Architect: Progress toward a State-Endorsed Identity (SEDI) in Utah." https://www.blockchaincommons.com/musings/Musings-SEDI/

Morris Mwanga is the founder of PersonaBlocks, a sovereign identity verification platform built on Polygon. PersonaBlocks is live on Polygon Amoy testnet at dev.personablocks.io.